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J I  C L R:
E  J
J. Mark Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen*
. I
Because civil law courts hire unproven jurists into career judiciaries, many use elaborate incentive structures to prevent their judges
from shirking. In Japan, for example, the courts maintain an administrative office called the Secretariat that regularly monitors and
evaluates each judge. On the basis of those evaluations, the
Secretariat assigns judges to new posts every three years. Because not
all posts are created equal, at least hypothetically it could use this rotation system to influence judges toward a variety of ends: it could
use it to induce judges to work hard, for example, or use it to induce
them to follow a political orthodoxy.
In the article that follows, we use data from Japan to discover
both the general determinants of judicial career success, and the actual extent of political manipulation. Toward that end, we assemble
career data on all  judges hired from  to . Within this
data base, we find strong evidence that the Secretariat rewards the
smartest and most productive judges. Contrary to some observers, we
find no evidence of ongoing school cliques, and no evidence that it
favors judges who mediate over those who adjudicate.
More controversially, we also find three signs that political considerations influence the careers of sitting judges. First, even as late
as the s, those judges who joined a prominent leftist organization in the s were receiving less attractive jobs. Second, whenever a judge decided a case against the government, he incurred a
significant risk that the Secretariat would soon punish him with a
less attractive post. Finally, those judges who decided a high percent*
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age of cases against the government early in their careers received less
attractive jobs than their peers in s.
We begin by outlining the theoretical and empirical literature on
judicial independence (Section ). We then explain the structure of
Japanese courts (Section ) and the nature of our data base (Section
). Using an ordered probit model, we first explore the determinants
of a judge’s initial job posting (Section .), and of his posts later in
his career (Section .). With more extensive data on the class of
, we then test whether a judge who decides cases against the
government receives less attractive posts (Section ). Finally, we turn
to the most common anecdotes of a link between the political content of a judge’s decisions and his career success: cases involving the
constitutionality of the ban on door-to-door canvassing (Section ).
. C-L S  J I
.. Manipulability. To understand the potential manipulability
of civil law courts, consider first—by way of contrast—the U.S. federal courts. To them, the president generally appoints only prominent middle-aged lawyers. Most have proven themselves both politically loyal and congenitally workaholic. He appoints these men and
women to particular posts in particular towns. There, they hear cases
for the rest of their working lives.
Sometimes, a federal judge will move from the district court to
the court of appeals. Sometimes, a Stephen Breyer will move from
the court of appeals to the Supreme Court. A William Webster will
move from the courts to the FBI. Otherwise, a typical judge never
moves out of town, never changes jobs, never earns a raise except in
lockstep with every other federal judge.1 For most federal judges,
how they do their job will have little effect on tenure, advancement,
or compensation.
Not so in many civil-law regimes. There, judges face just such
threats. Often, they join the courts immediately upon passing the
bar. Because they are young and unproven, the government has
relatively little information about them. It will seldom know their
political preferences. Perhaps more basic, neither will it know how
1

State court judges may face greater mobility. Yet even they seldom worry
that an administrator might move them from Los Angeles to Fresno, or demote them from an appellate court to traffic court.
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hard or how fast they work. Instead, it will need to make do with
proxies like exam performance.
Because of this limited information, in many civil law jurisdictions the government will set up elaborate monitoring and incentive
systems to induce its judges not to shirk.2 Toward that end, it will
maintain a judicial administrative office. Through that office, it will
regularly grade a judge’s work and dispense rewards. The better the
work, the more attractive a job it will give a judge and the more
money it will pay him.3
Incentive structures, however, are manipulable. A government
may introduce an institutional structure to induce effort but use it to
enforce political loyalty. At least in theory, in many civil-law systems
it could use the structure to reward judges by the political complexion of the judgments they issue and the opinions they write. The
loyal it could ply with prestigious posts in attractive cities and a quick
climb up the pay scale. The heterodox it could let languish at low
pay in branch offices in the outback. In most cases, politics will not
matter, for most cases involve no political issues of moment. In a
few cases it will—and the question at stake is whether the government will manipulate incentives to shape decisions in those relatively
unusual but sometimes vitally important cases.
.. Theory. Whether (or when) rational politicians will manipulate judicial incentives is an issue on which theory can go either
way.4 On the one hand, independent courts potentially solve several
vexing political problems—and perhaps for those reasons remain
perennially popular in ballot boxes and law reviews. First, they add
2 In common-law systems,
responsible judging will be one
equilibrium—but not the only one (Rasmusen, ). Presumably, where
judges are appointed without track records, the risk of irresponsible judging is
more severe.
3 E.g., Merryman (: ch. ); Clark (: ). Note, however, that
one can overstate the contrast. Even in common-law systems, judges may have
incentives to restrain their own idiosyncrasies. Rasmusen (); Easterbrook
(: ); Spiller & Gely ().
4 Whether politicians are self-interested or public-interested is not a central issue here. It is by no means clear that an unselfish politician would necessarily prefer judicial independence; he does not want the judiciary to thwart the
policies he proposes for the public good, whether because the judge disagrees or
because that beneficial policy is truly unconstitutional.
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credibility to governmental promises. Whether to maximize the
rents it extracts (Landes & Posner, ) or to lower the cost of its
debt (North & Weingast, ), a government will want to make its
commitments credible. Subjecting its promises to the judgment of
an independent court sometimes does just that.
Second, independent courts help police the bureaucracy
(McCubbins & Schwartz, ). By giving disaffected citizens the
right to sue a bureaucracy, a government can potentially obtain access to information about how well its bureaucrats perform. Armed
with that information, it can potentially improve bureaucratic performance and its party’s electoral odds.
Third, independent courts minimize a party’s losses while out of
power. To the extent judges are independent, they do not necessarily
serve the party in control. That they do not, in turn, will often
comfort out-of-power politicians and their electoral sympathizers
(Ramseyer, ). To the extent politicians and their supporters expect sometimes to be out of power, therefore, they may rationally
prefer courts that (by being independent) reduce the stakes to controlling the government.
On the other hand, independent courts introduce political
problems of their own. Politicians do not maximize votes by
promising desired policies, but rather by delivering desired policies.
Independent judiciaries can obstruct that delivery.5 Moreover, many
politicians rationally take short-term perspectives. They care less
about long-term credibility than about the next election. And the
ruling party will always have a temptation to cheat on judicial independence in small ways. For the party in power, the ideal judges are
those with a reputation for independence (thus making its promises
credible and cowing the bureaucracy) who actually do as it says.
Ultimately, therefore, the extent to which politicians keep judges
independent will depend on factors external to the courts. The more
readily politicians can make their promises credible, the more cheaply
they can monitor their bureaucrats, and the less likely they are to revert to minority status, the smaller their incentive to keep judges independent. Because they will always wish to pretend that the judges
5 Though even independent judges may sometimes find that restraining
their own behavior earns them returns of various sorts. See Rasmusen ();
Spiller & Gely (); Spiller & Spitzer ().
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are independent, however, any analysis of the actual outcome must
depend on observing behavior rather than words.
.. Empirical Studies. Existing empirical studies do not tell us
whether politicians in civil law systems keep their courts independent. Although several scholars have begun to publish sophisticated
empirical analyses of judicial independence, they have studied only
the comparatively hard-to-manipulate common-law systems (e.g.,
Spiller & Gely, ; Toma, ; Anderson, Shughart & Tollison,
; Cohen, ). Generally, they find some evidence, relatively
weak, either that judicial institutional structures affect the political
cast of what judges do, or that they respond—as Spiller and Gelly
(: ) nicely put it—“albeit quite indirectly, to interest-group
and voter pressures.”
Although civil law systems would seem to give more opportunities for political intervention, we know of no systematic econometric
study of judicial independence in a civil-law environment. A few
scholars have considered the relationship of civil-law judges to
politicians. To date, though, they have used historical rather than
quantitative approaches and emphasized crises rather than routine
situations (e.g., Muller, , on German judges under Nazi rule).
Even in Japan, where the debate has taken an aggressively political tone, most scholars have produced only anecdotal studies.6 The
most common accounts involve the ban in §  of the Public
Offices Elections Act on door-to-door canvassing.7 Because incumbents obtain free media coverage but challengers do not, the ban
disproportionately benefits incumbents. During the postwar years,
the Liberal Democratic Party (the LDP) had the most incumbents,
so the ban disproportionately benefited the LDP.
From time to time, a few lower court judges insisted that the
canvassing ban violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
expression. According to the anecdotal accounts, they incurred
penalties when they did (e.g., Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, : ch. ).
Take Haruhiko Abe. He held §  unconstitutional in , and by
6

For studies in English, see Hayakawa (); Miyazawa (); Ramseyer
(); Ramseyer & Rosenbluth (: chs. -). The best original empirical
research in Japan is probably Sakaguchi () and Tsukahara ().
7 Köshoku senkyo hö [Public Offices Elections Act], Law No.  of
, § 
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 had spent  years in branch offices, far more than normal (see
Table ). Or take Masato Hirayu. He held §  unconstitutional in
, and by  had spent  years in branch offices.
Yet anecdotal accounts are always subject to the criticism that
they reflect special situations and not the norm, and different anecdotes suggest different conclusions. John Haley, dean of Japanese
law scholars in the U.S., examined the evidence carefully in  and
concluded that Japanese courts remained fundamentally autonomous. Premier Japanese law and society scholar Setsuo
Miyazawa did the same in  and concluded the opposite. The
question thus remains open.
. T J C
.. Appointment and Reappointment. As in most civil law systems, Japanese judges begin their judicial careers immediately upon
passing the bar. They then stay judges for most of their working
lives. By the early s, the court system had ,-, judges
(see Table ). These judges decided some cases alone, but most as judge panels.
Formally, lower-court judges work a series of -year terms. The
prime minister, who from  to  was from the modestly conservative LDP, legally has the power to determine both initial appointments and later reappointments. In fact, he usually defers on
these matters to the Secretariat. Generally, he reappoints all sitting
judges until they either resign or reach retirement age.
.. Postings. During their careers of thirty-odd years, Japanese
judges move through a variety of posts. These posts vary along several dimensions. First, they vary by geography. The Secretariat
can—and does—routinely move judges from city to city.
Second, the posts vary along the judicial hierarchy. The
Secretariat can—and again does—bounce judges up and down the
hierarchy from the high courts (the courts of appeals) to the district
courts to the family courts (hearing cases involving, divorces, juveniles, guardians, etc.), to the branch offices of the district and family
courts. Note that the less prestigious postings are not extraordinary
occurrences, and do not necessarily signal disgrace (see Table ). As a
result, a judge who moves to a worse posting may have—but has not
necessarily—been identified for special treatment.
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B S
A. Selected Summary Statistics, Classes of -
Starting Age
Sex
Tokyo University
Kyoto University
Chuo University
No University
Opinions
First Post
s Post
First Location
s Location
YJL
Percent Early Antigovt.*
Percent Late Antigovt.*

Mean
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Minimum






.








Maximum






.








Observations:  for all except asterisked items, which are for the
Class of  only ( observations).
Note: Variables are as defined in Section ..

B. Aggregate postings, as of 
By Court HierarchyBy Geography
Secretariat

Other Non-judicial

High Court

District Court

Family Court

Branch Offices

Sökatsu


Tokyo
Osaka
Other Metropolitan
Non-metropolitan
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Third, some posts involve prestigious administrative duties. The
most successful judges become one of eight high court presidents.
Modestly successful judges become district or family court chief
judges. Almost all judges spend some time as a district judge with
internal personnel responsibilities (a sökatsu assignment). And a few
judges work several years in the Secretariat or at the Ministry of
Justice. The Secretariat itself selects the judges who staff the
Secretariat; it apparently negotiates the Ministry of Justice postings
with the Ministry’s own personnel office. Note too that visibility
and influence do not completely overlap. A staff position within the
Secretariat can be highly influential, even if not as visible as a seat on
the high court.
The Secretariat can also promote judges along the pay scale at
different speeds. By the constitution, it cannot cut a judge’s pay. It
can vary the rate of promotion, however, and critics have accused it
of penalizing the politically heterodox by doing just that.
Unfortunately, we lack judicial pay data and thus do not explore this
issue.
.. Judicial Preferences. To determine the relative attractiveness
of the various judicial appointments, we talked with a wide range of
Japanese observers and looked at the careers of the most successful
judges. Idiosyncratic preferences aside, most judges seem to prefer
Tokyo posts to all others, and to prefer Osaka if they cannot be in
Tokyo. They mildly prefer high and district court posts to family
court posts, and strongly prefer all such posts to lower court branch
offices. Most aspire to some administrative responsibilities.
In Table  we display the percentage of a judge’s career spent in
various assignments for two groups of judges: (a) the most successful
judges (they eventually became Supreme Court justices or high court
presidents), and (b) all those in the cohort of judges who began their
careers in , whether successes and failures, who had not retired
or left the judiciary early (before ). Note that the most successful
judges spend more time in Tokyo and Osaka, more time in the
Secretariat and other non-judicial posts (e.g., the Ministry of
Justice), and less time in branch offices. They do not spend much
more time as sökatsu than other judges, but this is because they more
quickly move to higher administrative roles like chief judgeships.
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Personal data:
Starting Age
Sex
Tokyo University
Kyoto University
Chuo University
No University
Opinions
YJL

Exceptional Judges
Mean Min. Max.

Class of 
Mean Min. Max.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.








.
.
.
.
.
.

















Percentage of career in various posts:
Tokyo
.

Osaka
.

Sökatsu
.

Secretariat
.

Other Non-judicial .

Branch Offices
.

Observations:









.

.
.
.
.
.
.







. .


.
.
.
.
.
.



Notes: The variables are as defined in Section .. “Exceptional judges” are
those judges who were named eventually either to the Supreme Court or
to the presidency of a high court, and whose career records appear in the
ZSKS. This rules out those appointed to these positions early in the
postwar era, as they would have begun their careers prior to the  and
thus would not appear in the ZSKS. For purposes of deriving these
figures, the time of appointment to the Supreme Court is treated as the
time of retirement. The percentage postings figures give the percentage of
career, as of , spent in the various positions.

.. The Supreme Court and the Secretariat. The Japanese
Supreme Court consists of fifteen justices who are appointed by the
prime minister and serve until mandatory retirement at age .
Among the last  justices, the mean age at appointment has been
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. The chief justice supervises the secretary general, the head of the
Secretariat. Generally, at least one Supreme Court justice is himself a
former secretary general.
Because the LDP appointed justices late in life, for most of the
postwar years the Supreme Court included only recent appointees.
By appointing them at age  with mandatory retirement at , the
LDP effectively mitigated the “Harry Blackmun problem”: the risk
that a politically loyal appointee would evolve over time into a very
different beast, and one who promoted his new agenda over that of
his benefactor. In contrast to U.S. presidents, the LDP could safely
appoint judges who would soon retire because it faced high odds
(though less than , as it turned out) of staying in power.
By appointing older justices, the LDP probably also increased its
stock of patronage capital. Suppose (as seems likely) that the
marginal utility to a judge of a Supreme Court appointment declines
over time. If so, then the LDP necessarily increased its patronage
capital by appointing more judges to the Court for shorter periods.
Given the extent to which even the minuscule probability of a
Supreme Court appointment can affect some American judges, this
carrot may have been quite useful.
Note two further political consequences. First, because the chief
justice supervised the Secretariat, the Supreme Court potentially
controlled appointments. Second, because the Supreme Court included at least one justice who recently had headed the Secretariat,
the Supreme Court had the information necessary to use that potential control. Indirectly but necessarily, by controlling Supreme
Court appointments the LDP potentially controlled lower-court
judicial careers as well.
.. This Project. In this study, we test whether the LDP exercised that potential control over the lower courts. Because posts vary
in quality and rotations were normal practice, by controlling the
Secretariat the LDP could potentially control judicial careers without visibly intervening. Invisibility is important, because constitutions seldom prevent politicians from intervening if they are willing
to be heavy-handed enough. If American senators dislike a judge’s
decisions, for example, they are free to impeach him on trumped-up
charges. Hypothetically, they might even be able to transfer him to
an undesirable city by changing the statutory structure of the courts
(Ramseyer, ). By doing so, however, they would incur high po-

J I



litical costs—both because of the time involved and because of the
effect it would have on the appearance of judicial independence.
The Japanese prime minister has analogous high-stakes options.
For instance, he can refuse on political grounds to reappoint a sitting
judge. He will incur high political costs if he does, however, as the
government discovered in  when a leftist judge was not reappointed (Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, : ). Perhaps the prime
minister could even intervene directly in the Secretariat to manipulate postings. Because the statutory structure of the courts does not
formally allow such direct intervention, though, we doubt that he
could intervene consistently for forty years in such a direct manner
and still keep it quiet.8
We test for a more subtle and indirect political strategy: that the
prime minister stacked the most powerful positions in the courts
with reliable judges who then used their power to ensure that ordinary judges had an incentive to toe the political party line.
Necessarily, our test is indirect: we look for correlation between political indices (a judge’s membership in leftist groups, or the content
of his reported decisions) and the desirability of the posts he receives.
. T D.
.. Sources. We collected data from three sources. First, for information on judicial careers, we used the Zen saibankan keireki
söran (ZSKS): a list of all postings for every judge hired after .
Second, for data on judicial opinions, we used the TDK
LEX/DB data base of judicial opinions. Available on eight CDROM disks, the data base works much like the Lexis and Westlaw
systems. Unfortunately, the collection is still slightly incomplete.
TDK began compiling the opinions only a few years ago and had
nothing like the West national reporter system from which to work.
Nonetheless, we have checked the compilation scheme, and have no
reason to think the coverage is biased in any way relevant here.
Last, we obtained the membership roster for the leftist Young
Jurists League (YJL) from Osorubeki saiban. The authors of that
8 Haley (), for example, makes much of the absence of this formal intervention.



C W P  L  E

book took the roster—current as of mid-—from the League’s
own newsletter.
.. Datasets. From this material, we produced four datasets.
(a) Exceptional judges. We collected data on the most successful
of the postwar judges: all judges in the ZSKS who eventually obtained postings to either the Supreme Court or the presidency of a
high court. As discussed above, we used this data to learn which
posts constitute advantageous assignments (see Table ).
(b) Judges who ruled on Section  cases. To explore whether
judges who decided politically sensitive cases in ways contrary to
LDP interests received unfavorable assignments, we investigated all
judges who published opinions on the issue most commonly cited in
this context: the constitutionality of the ban on door-to-door canvassing under §  of the Elections Act.
(c) Judges from the classes of  to . We compiled career data
on all judges, not just a sample, who entered the courts during 
to . In order to compare careers of equal length, we then
dropped those judges who had left the judiciary by April . Some
critics accuse the Secretariat of pressing left-leaning judges into early
retirement. To the extent that this happened, our findings will understate the true scope of any political discrimination. Because
Supreme Court justices have a large corps of professional judges at
their disposal to work as law clerks, elsewhere (e.g., for purposes of
calculating OPINIONS for Table ) we treated elevation to the
Supreme Court as retirement. Although in other circumstances this
might have biased our data the other way, for a simple reason it did
not do so here—as of , none of the judges in the classes of  had been named to the Supreme Court.
(d) Judges from the class of . For judges in the class of  (a
subset of dataset (c)), we investigated every decision the judge published that involved the government as litigant in one of four fields:
labor, administrative, tax, and criminal law. We included all opinions, whether written alone or by a three-judge panel. We coded an
opinion as “antigovernment” if the party fighting the government
won a full or partial victory.
Thoughtful readers will note the imprecision of this test. Many
of these opinions, for example, do not not involve distinctly political
issues. For a wide variety of reasons, moreover, the government may
not want to win even every suit. If it used biased judges to win every
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case, its litigators would have less incentive to work hard. If those
litigators did not always represent government interests (whether
because they were heterodox or lazy), it would find some victories
hollow. If the commitment problem Landes and Posner identified
is real, any overt control over the judiciary would reduce its rent-extractive potential. And if it perceived its judges as biased in its favor,
it might simply take more egregious positions—to the point where
even its progovernment judges would balk (this selection effect
reappears in Section .(a) below).
Despite these objections, we use our coding scheme for two basic
reasons. First, our scheme is simple and objective. We considered
coding opinions according to our subjective sense of whether they
furthered LDP interests, but concluded that doing so would invite
charges that we “cooked” the data. To minimize the chance of conscious or unconscious bias on our part, we opted for a less precise but
more objective test instead. Importantly, given the politically sensitive nature of our findings within Japan, this objectivity insures the
replicability of our results.
Second, caveats about incentive effects, promissory credibility,
and agency slack notwithstanding, governments generally litigate
disputes because they want to win them (even if not quite every
time). To that straightforward and forthrightly simplistic extent, a
decision that a government loses is an “antigovernment” decision
that will generally disappoint the men in power.
.. The Variables. We construct the following variables.
STARTING AGE: the age at which a judge joined the judiciary. To become a judge (or lawyer or prosecutor) in Japan, one
must graduate from the government-run two-year Legal Research
& Training Institute (the LRTI). During most of the years at stake,
the pass-rate on the entrance exam to this Institute ranged from  to
 percent. Would-be lawyers, prosecutors, and judges typically passed
it only on their d, th or th try. We hypothesize, therefore, that
the lower the age at which a person graduates from the Institute,
the higher his cognitive ability and the stronger his determination to
succeed. To the extent career success depends on intelligence and
drive, STARTING AGE should inversely correlate with career
success.
SEX:  if a judge is male and  if female.
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TOKYO UNIVERSITY:  if a judge went to Tokyo
University, and  otherwise. Because observers widely consider the
Tokyo University Law Department the most selective, graduation
there should positively correlate with intelligence and drive. Note,
however, that many critics argue that Tokyo University alumni form
a clique within the courts and help each other in their careers, independent of ability.
KYOTO UNIVERSITY:  if a judge went to Kyoto
University, and  otherwise. Traditionally, observers have considered
the Kyoto University Law Department second only to Tokyo
University. Critics have accused Kyoto University alumni of running
a clique as well.
CHUO UNIVERSITY:  if a judge went to Chuo University,
and  otherwise. Chuo University operates a large and respectable
but not first-tier law department. We include the variable because so
many judges attended the school.
NO UNIVERSITY:  if the ZSKS lists no university for a
judge, and  otherwise. A  could mean either that he attended the
LRTI without graduating from a university, or that he chose not to
disclose his educational background.
OPINIONS: the number of recorded decisions a judge published up to , divided by the number of years he spent on the
bench. We exclude those years during which he handled only administrative work.
Note a potential problem here. The law reporters (there are both
official and unofficial ones) do not publish all opinions. Instead,
they publish an opinion only if the editors find it interesting or important. If a branch office judge hears less important cases, this
could mean that he will not publish as much even if he works as
hard. That, in turn, presents a potential simultaneity problem.
Suppose OPINIONS is positively correlated with career success.
That fact could mean either that judges receive inferior assignments
because they publish less, or that they publish less because they receive inferior assignments. To resolve this problem, we used our
Class of  data to create another variable: productivity for all years
in courts other than lower court branch offices or summary courts.
Fortunately for our purposes, the correlation between that new variable and OPINIONS was ., indicating that adjusting for poor assignments would make little difference.
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FIRST POST: the prestige of the first assignment a judge
receives. The variable is  if it involves an administrative assignment,
 if it involves sökatsu duties,  if it is on a district or family court,
and  if it involves a lower court branch office or summary court.
For the vast majority of judges, the value was .
s POST: the prestige of a judge’s assignments during the
s. If he spent at least  years in an administrative assignment, it
is ; if he spent at least  years in either an administrative assignment
or a sökatsu post (but not  years in an administrative assignment), it
is ; if he does not qualify for the categories above and spent at least 
years in a lower court branch office or summary court, it is ; otherwise, it is . For this and the other variables, we count time in the
branch office only if the judge was not the official head of the
branch office, and did not have sökatsu status.
FIRST LOCATION: the location of a judge’s initial assignment. This is  if the judge’s first assignment was in Tokyo
(including Hachioji),  if it was in Osaka,  if it was in another large
metropolitan area (Yokohama, Nagoya, Sapporo, Kobe, Kyoto,
Fukuoka, Kawasaki, Hiroshima, or Kitakyushu), and  if otherwise.
s LOCATION: a judge’s location during the s. It is  if
he or she spent at least  years in Tokyo,  if at least  years in Osaka
or Tokyo (but not  years in Tokyo),  if at least  years in a major
metropolitan area (but not  years in Tokyo or Osaka), and  if
otherwise.
YJL: membership in the Young Jurists League (YJL). The YJL
is an organization of lawyers, law professors, and judges that generally supports leftist causes and which its detractors consider a Japan
Communist Party affiliate. The variable is  if the judge was a member in , and  otherwise.
EARLY ANTIGOVT: the number of antigovernment decisions (defined at Section .(d)) that a judge issued during -.
LATE ANTIGOVT: the number of antigovernment decisions
that a judge issued during -.
PERCENT EARLY ANTIGOVT: the percentage of antigovernment decisions that a judge issued during -.
PERCENT LATE ANTIGOVT: the percentage of antigovernment decisions a judge issued during -.
ANY EARLY ANTIGOVT:  if a judge issued any antigovernment decisions during -, and  otherwise.
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ANY LATE ANTIGOVT:  if a judge issued any antigovernment decisions during -, and  otherwise.
. T R.
.. First assignments. We begin by investigating the factors that
determine a judge’s initial assignment (Table ). The best jobs, our
regressions suggest, go to the smartest and hardest working judges.
Table  reports the results: an ordered probit regression of the characteristics of a judge on two measures of the attractiveness of his first
job. Consider each column separately.
 
D  F A
Sex
Starting Age
Tokyo University
Kyoto University
Chuo University
No University
YJL

A. First Post
-. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]

Pseudo R:
Observations:

B. First Location
. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]

.


.


Notes: Coefficients, followed by t-statistics in parenthesis, and confidence
levels in brackets.
Program: STATA, running ordered probit.

Column A: Recall that FIRST POST measures whether a
judge receives administrative responsibilities, receives a routine
district or family court assignment, or is stationed to a branch office
or summary court. Because no judge begins his career with administrative responsibilities, Column A effectively shows only that the
worst jobs (primarily the branch office assignments) go to the oldest
novice judges. Because age at appointment roughly correlates with
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the number of times the judge failed the LRTI exam, it inversely
correlates with intelligence and drive. The worst initial jobs, the regression thus suggests, go to the least smart and least hardworking
judges.
Column B: The regression on FIRST LOCATION asks who
receives the prized Tokyo and Osaka assignments. According to the
results, those jobs go to the judges (i) who are youngest, and (ii) who
attended the most selective universities. Once more, the regression
suggests that the best jobs go to the smartest and hardest working
judges.
The coefficient for YJL is insignificant in both regressions.
Because the League’s membership rolls did not become public until
, the Secretariat probably would not have known who was a
member. Nonetheless, if the coefficient had been significant, it
would have suggested that the Secretariat both had access to other
information about a judge’s political beliefs, correlated with YJL
membership, and used that information to discriminate by ideology.
In fact, it seems not to have done so.
.. Late assignments. Turn now to Table , the determinants of
late-career success. In this set of regressions, we ask which judges received the prized jobs in the s, some  years after they joined
the courts.
First, in the location regression STARTING AGE is significant, but in both regressions university affiliation is not. That
STARTING AGE continues to be important decades later
suggests that intelligence and drive matter, and in ways beyond their
effect on the judge’s first job. That university affiliation loses significance (other than through its effect on FIRST LOCATION)
tentatively suggests that critics exaggerate the importance of
university cliques. If cliques mattered, university affiliation should
affect later assignments, perhaps even more than the initial assignment, since over the course of time a judge’s university classmates
would rise to power in the judicial establishment. That a judge’s
university matters only through the initial assignment (while
STARTING AGE has an independent continuing effect) implies
that the Secretariat uses it as a proxy for ability in determining a
judge’s initial assignment, but finds that it becomes less useful as a
proxy once the judge has developed a track record.
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Second, FIRST LOCATION correlates with a judge’s later
assignments. This corroborates those accounts suggesting that the
Secretariat places new judges on fast and slow tracks, and that an
initial assignment to the Tokyo District Court predicts later success.
 
D  C S
Sex
Starting Age
Tokyo University
Kyoto University
Chuo University
No University
st location
Opinions
YJL

A. s Post
. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]

Pseudo R:
Observations:

B. s Location
. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
.(.) [.]
. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]

.


.


Notes: Coefficients, followed by t-statistics in parenthesis, and confidence
levels in brackets.
Program: STATA, running ordered probit.

Third, OPINIONS matters: judges who write many publishable opinions do better than those who write few. Although this
restates the importance of intelligence and hard work, its potential
significance goes further. From time to time, observers suggest that
Japanese society may reward judges who settle cases rather than decide them. Because of a cultural preference for negotiated settlements, they argue, Japanese encourage their judges to settle cases
when they can. Because settlements do not appear in our data, we
do not know whether the most successful judges settle the lowest
percentage of their disputes. We do know that the most successful
judges are the most prolific in writing published opinions for the
cases that failed to settle.
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Last, independent of intelligence and hard work, political preferences matter: whether a judge was a YJL member inversely correlates
with whether he received prestigious administrative responsibilities
in the s. Those judges named as part of the Marxist group in
 were still receiving less attractive jobs  to  years later.
Curiously, YJL membership did not affect the location where the
judge worked. Perhaps the Secretariat was willing to assign leftists
to the cities. Crucially, however, it did not trust them with the
highest positions within the judicial hierarchy.
Note that the correlation between YJL and STARTING AGE
is -.. Disproportionately, it seems, the most able members of the
judiciary joined the group. The point both explains why some
analyses that simply compare the jobs of League members and nonmembers find no discrimination (e.g., Ramseyer & Rosenbluth,
: ch. ), and underscores the importance of multivariate analysis.
. T E  A O.
.. The Method. We now turn to a more complex inquiry:
whether the way a judge decides a case influences the jobs he obtains. More specifically, we ask whether any tendency to decide cases
against the government hurts his career. We find that it does. The
phenomenon has two sides: (a) a punishment effect, where
antigovernment opinions translate immediately into less attractive
job assignments in the short-term, and (b) an information effect,
where antigovernment preferences revealed in a judge’s decisions
translate into a career disadvantage in the long-term.
Our first political variable was YJL membership, which was
cleanly defined and relatively easy to collect for the entire cohort of
 judges. We now wish to look at a more complicated characteristic: whether a judge rules for or against the government when the
government comes to court. This introduces problems in measurement, econometrics, and theory. We have already discussed some of
the measurement issues (Section .(d)). We shall turn to the theoretical issues in Section ..
The econometric issues result from the enormous amount of
time necessary to collect this data. Because of this problem, we
examined the opinions only of the  judges in the Class of , a
smaller number of observations than for all the classes between 
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and . We now must combine our  observations on judicial
opinions with our  observations on all the other variables relevant
to a judicial career. If we were willing to drop  observations, the
econometrics would be simpler: we would repeat the probit regressions in Table , but with opinion variables added to the righthand-side. This not only discards information, however, but raises
doubts about the validity of the estimates and the standard errors,
since probit is a nonlinear, asymptotic technique for which having a
large sample is especially important.
Instead, therefore, we take a different approach. We begin with
the regressions of Table , which use all  observations to predict
career success. These regressions do not explain all the variance in
the data, and generate an unexplained residual for each judge. If we
can explain this residual using judicial opinion variables, we will have
shown that a judge’s opinions matter, and ought to have been in the
regressions in Table . Moreover, because the residual is a continuous variable, we can use ordinary least squares, which does not rely
on asymptotics for its validity.
More specifically, we first turn to our Class of  dataset
and use our Table  regressions to generate a “residual” for each
judge. For this process, we take our estimated Table  coefficients
and each judge’s variable values. We then use these terms to generate
a “score” for each judge. As ordered probit also generates estimated
cutoff ranges, we match each judge’s “score” to the cut-off ranges in
order to generate a predicted posting for each judge (an integer from
 to ).
To explore how this works, take a hypothetical example. We did
not report the estimated cutoff scores above, but for the regression in
Table .A., they were -., -., and .. Suppose judge X has a
“score” of -.. Because it falls below the bottom cutoff of -., his
predicted posting is . If his score were -., he would fall in the . to -. range and have a predicted posting of .
Because for each judge we have only an estimated score, our
predictions do not take straightforward integer values. If we knew
with certainty that X’s score were -., we could predict with certainty a posting of . Because -. is just an estimate, however, his
true score might be higher or lower. With positive probability, it
might even be ., and if so his predicted posting would be  rather
than .
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Accordingly, if X’s “score” is -., our best prediction is not a
posting of  but a weighted average of , , , and . Those weights
will be our estimated probabilities of the true score lying in the four
intervals of [-infinity, -.], [-., -.], [-., .], and [.,
+infinity]. We find the probabilities by using the standard error of
our estimate. Our predicted career quality is the resulting weighted
average. By now comparing this predicted career quality with a
judge’s actual posting (of , , , or ), we calculate a residual—a
continuous variable that measures judge X’s unexplained career quality. If positive, it indicates that he did better than our regression
predicted; if negative, it indicates he did worse. Finally, we used a
logit transformation to map the value of the residual, which lies
between - and +, to the entire real line between positive and
negative infinity. This transformation maps the raw residual u to
log[(u + )/( - u)].
Having now constructed a variable representing the unexplained
success of a judge’s career, we ask whether any tendency to decide
public-law cases against the government has a negative correlation
with that variable. If judge X’s decisions had no impact on his career, then regressing his residual on a variable summarizing his decisions would yield an insignificant coefficient. If they did have an
impact, then—crucial to the analysis here—the coefficient might be
significant.
.. The Punishment Effect. According to Table , judges who
decide cases against the government soon receive less attractive jobs.
In Part A of Table , the absolute number of antigovernment
opinions that a judge writes in - inversely correlates with the
odds of receiving a post in an attractive city in the s. In Part B,
whether a judge decides any antigovernment opinions (a - variable) in - inversely correlates with receiving high-status posts
in the judicial hierarchy in the s.
The simplest explanation for this phenomena is that it represents a straightforward punishment strategy: if you decide cases
against the government, the expected value of your next several jobs
falls. The probability of punishment may well be less than . After
all, the government will not care equally about all its cases; it will not
want to win every case (for the reasons discussed in Section .(d));
and it will not necessarily punish every judge on a -judge panel (the
opinions do not identify dissenters, but the Secretariat probably has
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access to that information). Notwithstanding these caveats, according to Table , antigovernment opinions translate directly into less
attractive posts in the near future.
 
T P E
A. Number of Antigovernment Decisions:
Early Antigovt
Late Antigovt
R:

Post Residual
. (.) [.]
-. (l.) [.]

Location Residual
. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]

.

.

B. Any Antigovernment Decisions:
Any Early Antigovt
Any Late Antigovt
R:
Observations:

Post Residual
. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
.


Location Residual
-. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
.


Notes: Coefficients, followed by t-statistics in parentheses, and confidence
levels in brackets.
Program: STATA, running ordinary least squares on a logistic conversion
of the residual from the career regression.

We find the haphazard confidence levels a puzzle. In Part A,
only the location residual is significant, and in B only the post residual. We suspect that this reflects the noise in the data (discussed in
the immediately preceding paragraph) and the relatively small sample
size. Despite the large standard errors, however, the signs for the late
opinions are negative in all four regressions.
.. The Information Effect. Potentially, a judge’s opinions convey
information about his political preferences. If litigated cases were a
random sample of all disputes, for example, then the percentage of
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cases that the government won before a judge would say something
about his biases. The Secretariat could use that information to decide where to post its judges.
a. The selection bias. Litigated cases are not a random sample of
all disputes, however, and the percentage of cases won says as much
about the types of cases that go to trial as about how the judge views
disputes in general.9 In order to avoid the costs of trial, most disputants settle disputes whenever they agree about the likely litigated
outcome. As a result, cases do not go to trial randomly. Instead, they
go to trial when the judge’s expected decision is unclear. Just because
 percent of judge Y’s decisions are proplaintiff does not necessarily
mean he is proplaintiff: he may only be proplaintiff in the most
complicated cases, when the litigants found his decisions hardest to
predict. For the purposes of this analysis, settlement could have an
even more bizarre effect: it may be that the government goes to trial
with its most outrageous cases only when it knows the judge is particularly progovernment, and is only moderately displeased when the
government’s arguments are too weak even for that judge to
swallow. Thus, the judges who rule against the government most
often might be the progovernment judges.
Settlement will be most common where the parties know a
judge’s style and biases most precisely. If they know nothing about a
judge, he will hear cases that are randomly selected. Given that randomness, his verdict rate will indeed tend to disclose his biases. A
judge with a shorter track record is one about whom litigants will
have less information. Accordingly, we hypothesize that the selection bias will be strongest among judges at the end of their careers,
and weakest at the start.
Our data contain separate variables for early and late antigovernment decisions. Lack of correlation between these two variables
could be a sign either that no judges are biased, or that the selection
9 Priest & Klein (). Two further complications: under Japanese public
law, the government will find it hard to settle many categories of cases (e.g.,
tax disputes—see Kaneko, : ). Second, some observers claim that many
Japanese plaintiffs litigate public law disputes for their publicity effect rather
than because they expect to win the disputes. To the extant that either of these
phenomena occurs, the selection bias will be less and the percentage of government victories among a judge’s opinions will convey more information
about his political preferences.



C W P  L  E

effect means that once a judge acquires a track record, he tries only a
selected group of cases and his antigovernment percentage says
nothing about his biases. The correlation between PERCENT
EARLY ANTIGOVT and PERCENT LATE ANTIGOVT is
.. Whether the size of this correlation is evidence for or against
selection bias is unclear, but it is statistically insignificant (t=.,
significance level  percent). Second, the correlation between YJL
and PERCENT EARLY ANTIGOVT is ., and between YJL
and PERCENT LATE ANTIGOVT is .. If membership in
the YJL provided information about whether a judge would decide
cases against the government, we would worry more about a
selection bias even for younger judges. It does not seem to provide
such information, however, for the t-statistic for the regression of
PERCENT EARLY ANTIGOVT on YJL and a constant is only
. (a significance level of  percent).
b. The results. According to Table , a judge who decides a high
percentage of cases against the government early in his career does
indeed receive geographically less attractive jobs later in his career.
The percentage of antigovernment opinions early in his career
matters because it reveals information about his true biases. The later
career percentage does not, though the absolute number matters to
the government’s short-term punishment strategy (Table ), because
it conveys no meaningful information.
 
T I E
Percent Early Antigovt
Percent Late Antigovt

Post Residual
-. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]

R:
Observations:

Location Residual
-. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]

.


.


Notes: Coefficients, followed by t-statistics in parentheses, and confidence
levels in brackets.
Program: STATA, running ordinary least squares on a logistic conversion
of the residual from the career regression. Only  of the judges are used,
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because the others had no published opinions during the early time period
and their percentage of antigovernment opinions is thus undefined.

. E L D.
Consider now the most common anecdotal accounts of political
bias: the alleged discrimination against judges who held the § 
canvassing ban unconstitutional. Among lower court judges, we located  who held the ban constitutional and  who held it unconstitutional. Using the data on these  judges, we test whether a
judge’s decision on the issue affected the assignments he received.
Toward this end, we introduce several new variables:
PRIOR POSTS: the prestige of a judge’s assignment before the
§  decision. The variable equals  if he spent at least  years in an
administrative job during the  years before the decision;  if he did
not meet that requirement but spent at least  years in an administrative or sökatsu capacity;  if he did not meet either of those requirements but spent at least  years in a lower court branch office or
Summary Court; and  if otherwise.
LATER POSTS: the equivalent to PRIOR POSTS for the 
years after the decision. It takes the values , , , or .
PRIOR LOCATION: the desirability of the judge’s location
before the §  decision. The variable is  if the judge spent at least
 of the previous  years in Tokyo;  if at least  years in Tokyo or
Osaka (but not  in Tokyo);  if at least  years in metropolitan areas
generally; and  if otherwise.
LATER LOCATION: the equivalent to PRIOR LOCATION for the  years after the decision. It takes the values , ,
, or .
PRIOR OPINIONS: the judge’s productivity (published opinions per year on bench) for the  years before the §  decision.
 DECISION:  if the judge held the canvassing ban constitutional and  if otherwise.
Surprisingly perhaps, Table  shows no statistically significant
results.10 Critics of the court have consistently told stories of judges
10

We have omitted from these regressions the other variables used in this
study (e.g., STARTING AGE, TOKYO UNIVERSITY) because there is no
reason to expect them to be relevant to the measure tested here: the change i n
posting caused by the decision.
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punished for writing heterodox opinions on § . Notwithstanding, the initial results in Table  present no evidence of the
phenomena.
 
S §  S

Prior Posts
Later Posts
Prior Location
Later Location
Prior Branch
Later Branch
Prior Sökatsu
Later Sökatsu
Prior Opinions
Sex
YJL
Observations

Constitutional
Mean
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.


Unconstitutional
Mean
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.


 
E  §  O  C
Prior Posts
Prior Location
Prior Opinions
 Decision

Later Posts
. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]

Pseudo R:
Observations:

Later Location
. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]

.


.


Notes: Coefficients, followed by t-statistics in parentheses, and confidence
levels in brackets.
Program: STATA, running ordered probit.
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Recall, however, that the dependent postings and locational
variables we use in Table  are artificial composites of a variety of
different indices about the attractiveness of various types of posts.
To look more closely at what happened to the two different groups
of judges, we examine two key components of the postings variable:
time in branch offices, and time as sökatsu.Consider several additional variables:
PRIOR BRANCH: the percentage of years a judge spent in
branch offices during the  years (adjusted appropriately, if fewer
years on the bench) before the §  decision.
LATER BRANCH: the equivalent to PRIOR BRANCH for
the  years after the §  decision.
PRIOR SÖKATSU: the percentage of years a judge spent in
sökatsu assignments for the  years (adjusted appropriately, if fewer
years on the bench) before the §  decision.
LATER SÖKATSU: the equivalent to PRIOR SÖKATSU
for the  years after the §  decision.
 
E  §  O  B O 
S P
Prior Branch
Prior Sökatsu
Prior Opinions
 Decision

Later Branch
. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]
. (.) [.]

Pseudo R:
Observations:

Later Sökatsu
. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]
-. (.) [.]

.


.


Notes: Coefficients, followed by t-statistics in parentheses, and confidence
levels in brackets.
Program: STATA, running tobit.

The result confirms the popular accounts of the §  controversy: the position a judge takes on the constitutionality of §  ban
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significantly affects both the time he spends in branch offices and
the time he spends with sökatsu duties. Should he hold §  ban
unconstitutional (i) he significantly increases the amount of time he
will likely spend in branch offices over the next  years, and (ii)
significantly decreases the amount of time he will spend with
sökatsu responsibilities.
. C.
Because civil-law systems hire unproven jurists into career judiciaries, many maintain elaborate incentive structures to prevent their
judges from shirking. In this article, we use career data from the
Japanese courts both to explore the general determinants of career
success, and to test how extensively the government manipulates
those incentives toward political ends.
We find considerable evidence that the government rewards the
smartest and hardest working judges. Contrary to some observers,
we find little evidence of ongoing school cliques (more precisely, no
evidence beyond the school advantage in the initial job assignment).
We also find no evidence that the Japanese system rewards judges
who mediate over those who adjudicate. Rather, the judges who do
best are those who publish the most opinions.
More controversially, we locate several politically driven phenomena. First, those judges who joined a prominent leftist organization in the s were still receiving less attractive jobs than their
peers in the s. Second, those judges who decided cases against
the government faced a straightforward short-term penalty: on average, they received less attractive assignments over the next several
years. Last, those judges who decided a high percentage of cases
against the government early in their careers were still receiving less
attractive jobs than their peers in the s.
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